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Thoughts on the role of government changed late in the nineteenth century from non-
intervention in economic affairs to government control.  Events over the last decades have 
upstaged the ability of governments to achieve what had become to be major goals.  The future 
role should be a balance between what is wanted, what is possible, and who – national 
government, trading block or private enterprise – should do what. 
 
HEROORWEGING VAN DIE ROL VAN DIE OWERHEID IN SUIDER 
AFRIKAANSE LANDBOU 
 
Denke oor die rol van die regering het in die laat negentiende eeu verander van nie-
inmenging in ekonomiese aangeleenthede na regeringsbeheer.  Gebeure oor die laaste dekades 
het die vermoë van regerings om wat belangrike doelwitte geword het te bereik, twyfelagtig 
gemaak.  Die toekomstige rol moet 'n balans stel tussen wat begeer word, wat moontlik is en 




Patterns of thought concerning the appropriate role of government in 
economic life (including agriculture) have over time followed the general 
pattern of history; events tend to change the course of history.  Adam Smith's 
Wealth of Nations (1776) heralded a swing in thought – and policy – away from 
mercantilism to laissez faire, a dogma or ideology prescribing minimal role for 
government; government's role became restricted mainly to fields of 
governance not directly involved with economic life or trade.  Although 
Thomas Robert Malthus and David Ricardo pointed at misery involved with 
the inexorable march of economic events, most intellectual thought, and 
official policy remained non-interventionist in economic affairs.  However, 
these writings certainly influenced intellectual thought, including those of the 
Utopian Socialists (Roll, 1950 and Heilbroner, 1967), and more importantly, 
Karl Marx, who published his seminal major work, Das Kapital in 1864. 
 
The real catalyst that caused the pendulum to swing the other way was an 
occurrence which, normally, would economically be of little significance – the 
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Vienna stock exchange crash of 1873 (Drucker, 1990).  It caused advisors and 
governments to consider governmental intervention in economic life as a dire 
necessity.  Two types of socialism were to dominate intellectual thought and 
government action for the next 120 years: Marxism (communism) and national 
socialism (which should not necessarily be equated to Nazism, its most 
extreme form).  Even in the so-called bastions of capitalism, these policies and 
thoughts preponderated as shown by John Maynard Keynes' General Theory 
(1936) and the economic policies of President F.D. Roosevelt in the USA and 
Prime Minister Lloyd George in the United Kingdom.   
 
The belief in the power of governments to provide everything, or almost 
everything, for most, if not all, their citizens visibly started waning in the 
1970's and collapsed roundabout 1989 and 1990 with the final demise of the 
USSR.  One can only guess at the aftermath of the 1998 world financial crisis. 
 
It is now important to consider the potential role of government in Southern 
African agriculture, given existing knowledge and changed circumstances. 
 
2.  DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING AGRICULTURE 
 
2.1  The moves away from protection 
 
The economic and financial problems that beset agriculture after World War I, 
particularly the depression of the late 1920's and early 1930's, led to a 
worldwide phenomenon of protection and support.  Procedural 
methodologies included price fixation, floor prices, supply restrictions 
(production and/or marketing quotas), quantitative and qualitative import 
restrictions and export promotion (e.g. subsidization of exports).   
 
Over time, at least since the 1970's, national policies to shield or support local 
agriculture became increasingly ineffective.  The prime reason was increased 
inflexibility as governmental interference and control became more complex 
and increasingly dampened economic performance.  Schuh (1986) concluded 
that national agricultural price and income policies had became ineffective, 
largely because of four dramatic changes in world economics: 
 
i.  A worldwide increasing dependence on trade, causing any country to 
became more open to influences of events on international markets. 
 
ii.  The emergence of an well-integrated global capital market with 
international capital flows over twenty times the value of international 




iii.  The adoption of flexible and floating exchange rates; the effects of 
monetary policy are now transmitted to all trading sectors, including 
agriculture, and world agriculture has become more interdependent.  
 
iv.  Increasing monetary instability. 
 
The ineffectiveness of domestic policy became evident in the failure of USSR 
policies and the high costs of EU and U.S. policies.  Roningen & Dixit (1989) 
concluded that the net effects of agricultural protection were negative 
everywhere in terms of welfare and efficiency.  South Africa experienced 
increasing dissatisfaction with its Marketing Act, as it became increasingly 
ineffective in pursuing its goals.  Eventually, this Act was rescinded. 
 
The international experience led to the recent changes in WTO (formerly 
GATT) rules concerning trade in agricultural products.  These rules outlaw 
many policy tools previously used to protect domestic agriculture and also 
strive to reduce domestic protection over time. 
 
Although the new trade regimes should over time make developed countries' 
markets accessible to the developing countries' agricultural sectors and 
improve the latter's ability to compete, there is a giant backlog.  In addition, 
some developed countries have shown themselves to be rather averse to open 
their markets in the spirit of the Marrakesh Agreement, as is evident by the 
degree of "dirty tariffication" indulged in particularly by the EU (Ingco, 1995) 
and the EU's obvious reluctance to open markets to South African products. 
 
2.2  The changed nature of trade 
 
Since approximately mid nineteenth century, world trade was a competitive 
trade,  aimed at finding or creating customers and serving them.  The 
successes, particularly of Japan, in using new and powerful management 
technology and training to achieve very high productivity and virtually take 
over markets, has now changed trade into adversarial trade (Drucker, 1990).  
Adversarial trade aims at domination of a n  i n d u s t r y  e i t h e r  b y  d e s t r o y i n g  
adversaries or obtaining such predominance in a market that newcomers will 
find it almost impossible to challenge the market leader. 
 
Under such circumstances, as pointed out by Drucker (1990), we can no longer 
automatically assume trade to be completely beneficial.  Neither laissez-faire 
nor protectionism is the answer.  The answer lies in countervailing power, 
which can be obtained only by forming economic regions or blocks – as has 




capable of mounding an effective trade policy that transcends both 
protectionism and free trade (Drucker, 1990).  Such a unit is capable of 
reciprocity.  Free trade can be encouraged within blocks, although reciprocity 
may under circumstances be applied within blocks, given very unequal power 
bases.  Under reciprocity two blocks’ businesses would enjoy the same 
entrance in each other's markets – no more and no less.  A regional or trading 
organization needs to be beneficial to all its members – it must be a club worth 
belonging to (Sunter, 1992).  The EU prospered because it was club worth 
belonging to; the USSR was not.  Reciprocity can be used for goods, services 
and know-how.  We must ask the question: Is SADC a club worth belonging 
to?  If not, what can be used in its place? 
 
2.3 Comparative  advantage 
 
The movement from competitive to adversarial trade caused a change in the 
nature of comparative advantage.  Comparative advantage has largely been 
based on the quality, availability and prices of land, labour and capital. 
However, since management has became the decisive factor of production, it 
is now management on which comparative advantage has to be based.  This 
poses a quandary for the developing world: Managerial skills have to be 
developed (at all levels concurrently with technical skills), but also directed 
toward the products that developing countries (or blocks thereof) hope to 
specialize in. 
 
A further sign of this is the decline in commodities' and raw materials' share 
of world trade, also within agricultural trade.  Trade in processed foods has 
been the most rapidly expanding portion of world agricultural trade, and 
already exceeds the value of unprocessed agricultural products (Henderson et 
al, 1996).  Another sign of the changed nature of comparative advantage is the 
major role now played by transnational companies, usually through foreign 
affiliates.  Sales of foreign affiliates of U.S. food companies have became a 
fourfold of U.S. processed food exports (Henderson et al, 1996).  
 
3.  HOW SPECIAL IS AGRICULTURE? 
 
It is probably attractive for any line of business to claim uniqueness as 
justification for special policy – as has always been done by agriculture and 
some other economic sectors.  One may, however, question the degree to 
which any economic activity, including, agriculture, can claim uniqueness. 
Caswell (1997) states that farming as a business is not unique from many other 
small, medium and large businesses and nor are the characteristics of food 




narrowed down to relative degrees of maturity.  South Africa, being part of 
the developing world, may differ substantially from the developed countries 
concerning the position of non-commercial and newly commercialising 
farmers. 
 
Although Caswell's points are debatable and have been criticised (Kilmer, 
1997), this should be considered when framing policy.  The similarity to other 
similar sized businesses was certainly not lost on arguably the father of farm 
management:  "The success of the individual farmer is as much dependant on 
the application of business principles as it is on crop yields and production of 
animals" (Warren, 1913). 
 
It is fragmentary to equate agriculture with farming.  While farming is central, 
it is not synonymous with a modern agriculture which also includes services 
rendered to agriculture, further processing and marketing of products, supply 
of inputs and agri-milieu (Mosher, 1970). 
 
4.  LIMITS TO GOVERNMENT 
 
In the century following the 1873 Vienna Stock Exchange crash the role of 
government in economic life (including agriculture) increased steadily.  The 
question was invariably: "What should government do?"; "What can 
government do?" was seldom asked if at all.  Mankind had almost limitless 
confidence in the ability of the State to plan and deliver desired benefits. 
Questions involving governmental action had more a moral than economic 
content. 
 
The cracks in the dogmatic belief of government's omnipotence started 
appearing in the 1970's (in the aftermatch of the World Oil Crisis), widened 
during the economic upheavals of the 1980's and burst open with the demise 
of the USSR. 
 
It is time to take stock of what government can and cannot do – even though 
governments, and particularly bureaucracies whom developed around 
governmental action, usually find it hard – or traumatic – to terminate actions 
that do not work.  There are always efforts to fine-tune what should be 
scrapped.   
The events have illustrated that central planning of economic activity does not 
work.  It is technically impossible to plan from the centre, and the bigger and 
more open the economy, the more impossible it becomes (Maasdorp, 1992). 
Such efforts go hand in hand with poor co-ordination, and lack of motivation 




"Effendis" as advisors to governments in developing countries. Effendis are 
characterised as intelligent well-educated people, who think they know it all; 
they have an inborn tendency to interfere in the lives of common people 
(Sunter, 1992).  Friedrich von Hayek (1944) called this as a "fatal conceit".  It is 
important note that the expertise needed for central planning and even for 
evaluating Effendis' efforts is very scare in developing countries.  Neither can 
a government change the Laws of Economics and Management. 
 
Another type of activity that governments usually don't do well, is the 
production of goods and services for both industrial and personal 
consumption as demonstrated by inefficiencies in nationalised industries in 
many countries such as Great Britain, France and South Africa.  Experience in 
many industries and countries have proven that privatisation improves 
efficiency, provided ample competition is ensured. 
 
T h i s  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  g o v e r n m e n t  should not provide services.  Many 
cannot be provided without government's contribution (and some can be 
provided only by government), but the production (delivery) can be done 
privately while being contracted by government (Kolderie, 1986).  This modus 
operandi has become well established, using the term "outsourcing". 
 
A further limitation in government lies in the sheer size and cost of 
government services.  Services have to be paid, and are paid through taxes or 
inflation or both.  High levels of either are injurious of economic growth and 
work ethic (Sunter, 1992).  It has been argued that South African tax rates are 
already high; further increases will stunt development (Loots, 1992). 
 
There are "easy" and "hard" government activities.  In the former all 
constituencies want the same result, and a government can do it – although, 
e.g. in postal services, a government often needs a monopoly to do it.   
Activities are hard if different constituencies demand different things and 
have different values and expectations.  In many programs, governments 
promised different things to different people, or attempted to benefit some 
groups at the expense of others.  The result and controversies made it 
impossible for governments to perform (Drucker, 1990). 
 
5. THE  RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT 
 
Limitations of government do not absolve government from duties and 
responsibilities.  Governments are elected to do the best they can do for the 
population.  The first responsibility is a clear and respected legal system, also 




control of crime.  But the state should do more: Adversarial trade has 
rendered trade blocks a necessity.  Governments in Southern Africa should 
now be serious about turning the SADC in a genuine trading block, even if 
this will require some sacrifices.  Recent events have seriously dented the 
SADC's credibility.  Southern African states, given a certain degree of stability, 
might look elsewhere in the Southern Hemisphere or Indian Ocean Rim.  
 
In at least three countries, it is a main challenge to level the playing field 
between white and black.  This must done in a way that will not jeopardise 
productivity and the ability of the economy to grow and thus creating more 
unemployment and poverty.  One necessity is to avoid creating uncertainty 
concerning the ability of economic subjects to maintain and enjoy the fruits of 
their labour, capital and management – as witnessed in Zimbabwe.  An 
investor friendly environment is a first requirement. 
 
So, what can the State do in this regard?  Empowerment is the obvious 
answer.  But this is easier said than done.  Empowerment will first and all 
have to consist of managerial development – in terms of knowledge, involving 
technical, financial and marketing know-how.  Government obviously has to 
play a major role in the provision – not necessarily production – of such 
services.  Capital and land are also needed for empowerment.  In this respect, 
proven financial principles need to be respected if the State is not to create a 
clan of insolvent failures.  Experience has shown that financial success is rare 
if a farmer's own equity is exceeded by his debt – and also that a farmer short 
on capital does better by leasing, rather than buying land.  A change in the 
modus operandi of the Department of Land Affairs in South Africa is urgently 
needed.  In terms of capital problems, the Start-up Fund together with a few 
private sector corporations, has proven itself (Sunter, 1998). At this stage, it 
still has limited scope.  Government investment in this fund may be a wise 
step.   
 
Empowerment, order in a deregulated market and competitiveness in a global 
economic world require high quality information – as put by Sunter (1997), a 
sensitive radar system.  Without this, smaller and emerging as well as most 
commercial farmers, processors and traders are left to the mercy of more 
powerful competitors and adversaries.  This is indeed an urgent task for 
government.  Once again, provision and production need not necessarily be 
done by the same institution.  In addition, a decision has to be made as to 
what kinds of information will be available free, and what at a cost to the user. 
 
A prerequisite for international competitiveness is efficiency in production, 




be an anathema to such efficiency.  Therefore, control over monopolies can be 
regarded as an important responsibility of government in the modern, global 
economy. 
 
Farmers in Southern Africa need protection from foreign governments, 
particularly governments of developed market economies.  It was largely the 
agricultural policies of the USA and EU that necessitated the Uruguay Round 
of the GATT.  It has mostly been EU import tariffs as well as subsidised USA 
and EU agricultural exports that have put pressure on some Southern African 
agricultural industries.  The EU has shown itself to be averse to the opening of 
European borders for importation of farm products.  In terms of current WTO 
regulations, member countries may take action against unfair action 
competing countries.  Such action will, off course be dependent on intelligence 
involving such actions.  This will require a much more efficient early detection 
and warning system than is now available anywhere in Southern Africa.  The 
obvious location will be entering locations – harbours and airports.  This 
action will once again have to provided by the State – or in the long run, a 
trading block.  Once again, outsourcing or partnership with business is likely 
to be the most efficient way of providing the service. 
 
Government should also be able to grant short-term relief to victims of short-
term catastrophes such as drought, floods, epidemics, etc. 
 
6. A  FINAL  EVALUATION 
 
History has taught that some things can be done, some not.  We must benefit 
from the lessons of history.  Governmental action affecting the economy – 
including agriculture – should be a balance between what is desired and what 
is possible.  Finally also, it should be decided what is the function of 
government and what should be done for government.  And eventually, what 
i s  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  o n e  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  w h a t  s h o u l d  b e  d o n e  b y  a  t r a d i n g  
block. 
 
These considerations should be kept in mind by Southern African 
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